By Mrs. Eileen Hunter — about the author. Posted August 11, 2026.
Provenance: Motion to Reconsider Judgment on Uniform Application for Post-Conviction Relief, filed June 4, 2026 in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita, No. 2002-F-2021, by Longman Jakuback, APLC. Denied June 9, 2026 — the denial now under review in the pending writ application. Transcribed below in full from the filed motion’s text; wording as filed.
MOTION TO RECONSIDER JUDGMENT ON UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
NOW INTO COURT comes TONY HUNTER who, through undersigned counsel and for the following reasons of law and fact, respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its May 4, 2026 ruling on Mr. Hunter’s Application for Post-Conviction Relief. In support of this request, counsel and Mr. Hunter offer the following:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following a conviction for Second Degree Murder, Mr. Hunter’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Tony Lavelle Hunter, 907 So.2d 200 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/05), writ denied, 925 So.2d 507 (La. 3/10/06). According to the decision of the Louisiana Second Circuit on Hunter’s direct appeal, the testimony of the three jailhouse informants was, ultimately, “the only evidence that directly linked Tony Hunter with the crime.”
On February 14, 2007, Mr. Hunter timely filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief raising six claims and attaching affidavits from Rodney Gay, Solomon Moore, and James Divers in support of a request for an investigator to investigate newly discovered fact-based claims. The trial court denied the application without a hearing on May 31, 2007.
Mr. Hunter’s counseled second application for post-conviction relief was filed on March 16, 2009. That application raised a newly discovered Brady/Kyles claim based on a handwritten note by an investigator dated February 20, 2004, disclosed with the District Attorney file years after trial. The note memorialized a conversation with Corey Smith, the owner of the .22 caliber handgun used in the homicides on Greenwood Drive. According to the note, Smith, who had been arrested for fighting at the Library Lounge on January 11, 2001, told the investigator that he gave the keys to his truck to his friend Keith Norman so Norman could move Smith’s truck from the Library Lounge parking lot. According to the note, Corey believed Keith Norman traded the gun for drugs, and Corey noticed the gun and other items missing the next day after his arrest when he checked the glove box of his vehicle. The fact that Smith was arrested on January 11, 2001, at 1:07 a.m. was verified by a police report. The trial court denied Mr. Hunter’s second application without an evidentiary hearing on July 14, 2009.
Mr. Hunter later filed a third post-conviction application based on newly discovered evidence contained in Glen Dale Nelson’s January 31, 2012, affidavit. In that affidavit, Nelson stated that the alleged jailhouse confession was a “jailhouse conning scheme” organized by Vaccara Comanche and Clarence Kennedy to obtain a conviction against Mr. Hunter. The trial court denied Mr. Hunter’s third application without an evidentiary hearing on May 29, 2013.
On December 30, 2022, Mr. Hunter, through counsel, filed an application for post-conviction relief based on factual innocence pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2. That application alleged that Mr. Hunter is factually innocent of the triple homicide and attempted armed robbery on Greenwood Drive. It relied on new, reliable, non-cumulative evidence, including Professor Robert M. Bloom’s declaration regarding jailhouse informants, Jody Rucks’s affidavit, Stephanie Stokes’s alibi affidavit, affidavits from Willie Campbell and Keith Davis concerning the jail-window issue, prior affidavits from Rodney Gay, Solomon Moore, and James Divers, and other evidence undermining the reliability of the State’s jailhouse-informant case. Article 926.2 expressly allowed a petitioner’s first factual innocence claim to avoid the usual Article 930.4 and 930.8 bars if filed on or before December 31, 2022, and if the petitioner was convicted after trial.
DETAILED HISTORY OF POST CONVICTION APPLICATION(S)
Mr. Hunter submitted his first post-conviction application in February 2007. This application was filed pro se and raised six (6) claims — specifically, Mr. Hunter raised Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, failure of trial counsel to investigate, a challenge to the jailhouse informant testimony and allegations of withheld exculpatory material. Mr. Hunter alleged that his attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate and present impeachment evidence by obtaining an audiologist to demonstrate that it would have been impossible through the jail’s double-paned windows for the jailhouse informants to hear the testimony they claimed at trial inculpated Mr. Hunter. Mr. Hunter also drew the court’s attention to testimony from a bond-reduction hearing that should have been used by his trial counsel to discredit Comanche’s claim. He further alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena jail records/logbooks to demonstrate that he was not, in fact, in the recreation yard at the time that Kennedy claimed to hear Mr. Hunter speaking through a window.
In his fourth claim, Mr. Hunter argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use a police report and/or pretrial testimony to discredit witnesses Kennedy and Comanche who claim to have overheard Mr. Hunter and Glen Dale Nelson discussing details of the murder. Finally, Mr. Hunter raised a Brady-style claim that the State failed to disclose exculpatory material, including statements, reports, recordings, interviews, or investigatory materials that should have been produced in advance of trial. Notably, this application alleged that trial counsel failed to investigate and present a defense. It did not allege that the State suppressed newly discovered impeachment material that demonstrated Comanche’s habitual-offender exposure or favorable treatment after his testimony.
In March 2009, Mr. Hunter filed a successor PCR, alleging newly discovered Brady/Kyles material. Mr. Hunter alleged that the State failed to disclose evidence that the .22 handgun used in the murders had been stolen from Corey Smith’s truck and that Smith believed that Keith Norman took or traded the gun for drugs. Supporting this claim, Mr. Hunter alleged that post-conviction counsel had received materials including a witness statement that indicated for the first time that the weapon purported to have been used in the offense was stolen and, at the time of the offense, was in possession of someone other than Tony Hunter. Mr. Hunter alleged that knowledge of the existence of another, more probable suspect, is something that would have turned the tide at his original trial. While the application concerns a Brady/Kyles claim, they concern different evidence and different constitutional injuries. The 2009 Brady/Kyles claim raised by Mr. Hunter involved suppressed alternative suspect evidence, whereas the 2026 Brady/Giglio/Napue claim involves impeachment evidence about Comanche’s motive, bias, habitual offender exposure, and alleged benefit in exchange for testimony.
In January 2013, Mr. Hunter filed his third successor post-conviction application. This application alleged, in pertinent part, that Mr. Hunter was factually innocent and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence regarding Glen Dale Nelson, the alleged jailhouse-confession participant. Mr. Hunter’s 2013 filing relied on an affidavit supplied by Nelson, and Mr. Hunter’s trial counsel’s failure to investigate Mr. Nelson. This petition did not include the later-discovered Comanche rapsheet, sentencing transcripts, court minutes, or documentation relative to Comanche’s status as a habitual offender. In contrast to Mr. Hunter’s 2026 filing, the 2013 filing attacks Mr. Hunter’s trial counsel as opposed to evidence of undisclosed impeachment evidence and the State’s failure to disclose material evidence about one of the key witnesses in the jailhouse informant scheme.
Mr. Hunter’s next Application for Post-Conviction Relief was filed in December 2022 and sought relief based on factual innocence under La. C.Cr.P. Art 926.2. Mr. Hunter, through counsel, relied on the absence of physical evidence, alibi evidence, jailhouse informant expert analysis, affidavits regarding window thickness and affidavits detailing inmate fabrication. The 2022 application challenged the reliability of jailhouse testimony as part of a sweeping demonstration of actual innocence, whereas Mr. Hunter’s 2026 application is narrower in scope. The 2026 application alleges that the State suppressed specific impeachment evidence concerning Comanche’s habitual-offender exposure and his favorable treatment. The 2026 application further alleges that the jury heard materially incomplete or false testimony about whether Comanche received or expected a benefit in exchange for his testimony. Where the 2022 claim is one of freestanding innocence, the 2026 claim relies specifically on the holdings of Brady/Napue to seek relief.
Mr. Hunter’s instant claim was presented through his 2026 Uniform Application for Post-Conviction Relief and the supplement filed shortly thereafter. Read together, those filings assert a distinct Brady/Giglio/Napue violation arising from current counsel’s discovery of previously undisclosed impeachment evidence concerning Vaccara Comanche, one of the State’s principal jailhouse witnesses. The application alleges that the State failed to disclose evidence bearing on Comanche’s habitual-offender exposure, motive to cooperate, expectation of benefit, and favorable sentencing treatment following his recorded statement, and testimony against Mr. Hunter. In support of that claim, Mr. Hunter submitted both Glen Dale Nelson’s 2012 affidavit and a newly conducted 2026 interview with Mr. Nelson.
Shortly after filing the Uniform Application, counsel supplemented the record with Comanche’s rap sheet, sentencing transcript, court minutes, and documentation relating to his habitual-offender proceedings. The supplement did not assert a new claim; instead, it supplied the documentary evidence underlying the Brady/Giglio/Napue allegations already before the Court. When viewed together, the Uniform Application, Mr. Nelson’s affidavit, Mr. Nelson’s 2026 interview, and the supplemental records present a single constitutional claim: that the State failed to disclose material impeachment evidence concerning Comanche, thereby depriving the defense and the jury of critical information bearing upon the credibility, bias, motive, and reliability of one of the State’s key witnesses.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
I. The district court reached the incorrect conclusion when it determined that Mr. Hunter’s most recent application contained cumulative information regarding Glen Dale Nelson.
The district court erred to the extent it treated Mr. Hunter’s present Brady/Giglio/Napue claim as repetitive or cumulative merely because Glen Dale Nelson previously executed an affidavit in 2012.
In State v. Broadway, 252 So.3d 878 (2018), the Louisiana Supreme Court articulated that the Brady rule encompasses the suppression of any evidence favorable to the accused — including impeachment evidence — where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, without regard to the good or bad faith of the prosecution. The Brady rule extends to evidence that impeaches witness testimony when that witness’s credibility may determine guilt or innocence. The critical inquiry under Louisiana law is materiality. As the Louisiana Supreme Court confirmed in State v. Broadway, a prosecutor does not breach the constitutional duty to disclose “unless the omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial”. The materiality standard, drawn from Kyles v. Whitley and United States v. Bagley, asks not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict, but “whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” State v. Biagas, 754 So.2d 1111 (2000). A Brady violation occurs when the evidentiary suppression “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” State v. Broadway, 252 So.3d 878 (2018).
The Louisiana Second Circuit itself recognized on direct appeal that the testimony of the jailhouse witnesses constituted “the only evidence that directly linked Tony Hunter with the crime.” Consequently, impeachment evidence affecting one of those jailhouse witnesses necessarily assumes heightened constitutional significance. Where the State’s case depended on jailhouse-witness testimony, suppressed impeachment evidence concerning Comanche’s motive, bias, expectation of benefit, and favorable treatment cannot be dismissed as cumulative or immaterial.
Mr. Hunter has appealed to this Honorable Court with evidence that material impeachment information on a crucial witness was withheld by the State. This evidence — a favorable deal offered to Vacarra Comanche — would certainly have called into question confidence in the outcome of a trial where Mr. Hunter was convicted primarily on circumstantial evidence and the State relied on the testimony of jailhouse “snitches”. The statement of Glen Dale Nelson, submitted with the 2026 application and accompanying the evidence related to Mr. Comanche’s habitual offender status, provide a lens to the Court and a finder of fact through which the impeachment material should be considered both by this Honorable Court and any reviewing Courts. Mr. Nelson has argued and continues to assert that the testimony of Vacarra Comanche with respect to the “overheard confession” was and remains materially false. The transcript provided by existing post-conviction counsel is supporting evidence for this Court to consider the “total record” and, after due consideration, make “a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298.
In federal court, when raising a Brady/Napue claim — petitioner is required to show: (i) “the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence,” and (ii) “the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense”. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244.
As in the case in In re Will, counsel has met the objective standard for demonstrating that the materials presented to the Court in the instant application could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Prior to trial on the merits, the State indicated that Brady material and obligations were satisfied, presumably including the obligation to turn over relevant impeachment material. There is no record, however, in either the defense file or many of the previous post-conviction counsel files to support that the State knew at the time of trial that there was a tacit agreement with Vacarra Comanche with respect to his testimony. Similar to the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Will, Mr. Hunter has made a “sufficient showing of possible merit [on the question of due diligence] to warrant a further exploration by the district court.”
With respect to the requirement that a petitioner must establish that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense, House v. Bell (547 U.S. 514, 2006) indicates that habeas courts consider “all the evidence” to “assess the likely impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors”. Based on this total record, the court must make “a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298.
The conclusion by the trial court that the statement of Glen Nelson was merely cumulative misidentifies both the claim being asserted and the purpose for which Mr. Nelson’s statements were submitted. Mr. Hunter does not rely on Mr. Nelson’s 2012 affidavit as the operative “newly discovered evidence” in the present application. Nor does Mr. Hunter seek to relitigate the 2013 post-conviction claim that relied on Mr. Nelson’s affidavit. The present application raises a different constitutional violation: that the State failed to disclose material impeachment evidence concerning Vaccara Comanche, including evidence bearing on Comanche’s habitual-offender exposure, motive to cooperate, expectation of benefit, and favorable sentencing treatment following his testimony against Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Nelson’s affidavit and 2026 interview were submitted in support of that Brady/Giglio/Napue claim. They provide context for why the undisclosed impeachment evidence concerning Comanche mattered. They also bear directly on materiality because the State’s case was dependent on jailhouse-witness testimony. Evidence that Comanche had undisclosed criminal exposure, incentive to curry favor with the State, and possible favorable treatment would have carried greater significance when viewed alongside Mr. Nelson’s explanation of how the alleged jailhouse confession was fabricated and why he did not testify. The 2026 Nelson interview was not merely a repetition of the 2012 affidavit. The affidavit generally asserted that the alleged jailhouse confession was part of a fabricated jailhouse scheme. The 2026 interview provided additional details regarding the mechanics of that scheme, the roles played by Comanche and Clarence Kennedy, the circumstances surrounding the false allegations attributed to Mr. Hunter, and Mr. Nelson’s reasons for not testifying. Those details were not offered to resurrect an old claim. They were offered to show why the newly discovered impeachment evidence concerning Comanche would have mattered to a jury and why, had the prosecution provided the discovery at trial[, the result] necessarily would have been different.
Importantly, those facts do not appear in Mr. Nelson’s 2012 affidavit and therefore cannot properly be characterized as cumulative. While the 2012 affidavit generally asserted that the alleged jailhouse confession was part of a fabricated scheme, the 2026 interview provides additional factual detail regarding the creation of that scheme, the roles allegedly played by Comanche and Kennedy, and Mr. Nelson’s reasons for not testifying. Because those facts were not previously before the Court, the 2026 interview adds substantive information that bears directly upon the materiality of the newly discovered impeachment evidence and the reliability of the State’s jailhouse-informant testimony.
That distinction is critical. Evidence is not cumulative simply because it relates to a witness or subject previously mentioned in earlier litigation. Evidence is cumulative only when it merely repeats what has already been presented without adding meaningful new facts, context, or probative force. Mr. Nelson’s 2026 interview did more than repeat his prior affidavit. The 2026 affidavit of Glen Nelson expanded the factual record, clarified the alleged fabrication, and connected the jailhouse-informant scheme to the materiality of the newly discovered Comanche impeachment evidence.
The district court’s analysis appears to conflate a supporting witness with the constitutional claim itself. The claim is the State’s suppression of impeachment evidence concerning Comanche. Mr. Nelson’s statements are supporting evidence that help explain the importance of that suppressed impeachment evidence. A Brady/Giglio/Napue claim does not become repetitive merely because one item of supporting evidence involves a witness who appeared in an earlier post-conviction proceeding. Nor does the prior submission of Mr. Nelson’s 2012 affidavit bar Mr. Hunter from relying on Mr. Nelson’s later, more detailed interview for a different purpose. The 2013 filing used Mr. Nelson’s affidavit primarily to challenge trial counsel’s failure to investigate and to attack the reliability of the alleged jailhouse confession. The 2026 filing uses Mr. Nelson’s affidavit and interview to demonstrate the materiality of newly discovered impeachment evidence concerning Comanche.
The supplemental records (provided by current post-conviction counsel) further confirm that the present application is not merely a recycled Nelson claim. The supplement provided Comanche’s rap sheet, sentencing transcript, court minutes, and habitual-offender materials. Those documents form the objective evidentiary foundation of the present Brady/Giglio/Napue claim. Mr. Nelson’s statements explain why that evidence matters; the Comanche records show what the State allegedly failed to disclose. Viewed properly, the 2012 affidavit, the 2026 interview, and the supplemental Comanche records operate together. The Comanche records establish the alleged undisclosed impeachment evidence. Mr. Nelson’s affidavit and interview provide context and materiality. Together, they support one constitutional claim: that the jury never received critical information necessary to evaluate the credibility, bias, motive, inducement, and reliability of one of the State’s principal jailhouse witnesses.
Article 930.4 does not permit dismissal simply because a petitioner has previously litigated a related subject matter or because the name of a witness appears in more than one post-conviction application. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4. The relevant inquiry is whether the specific constitutional claim presently before the Court was previously raised and adjudicated. Here, the Court’s ruling identifies no prior application in which Mr. Hunter alleged that the State suppressed impeachment evidence concerning Vaccara Comanche’s habitual-offender exposure, favorable treatment, expectation of benefit, motive to cooperate, or bias as a State witness. Nor does the Court’s ruling identify any prior proceeding in which a Brady/Giglio/Napue claim based upon those allegations was adjudicated on the merits.
Accordingly, the district court erred in treating the present claim as repetitive or cumulative based on Mr. Nelson’s prior affidavit. The present application does not seek relief because Mr. Nelson executed an affidavit in 2012. It seeks relief because newly discovered material shows that the State withheld material impeachment evidence concerning Comanche, and Mr. Nelson’s later interview provides additional context demonstrating why that withheld evidence was material. The claim is therefore distinct, non-cumulative, and entitled to be reviewed on a complete record.
II. The district court erred in determining that Mr. Hunter’s procedural deficits constituted “inexcusable failure” to comply with the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. Art. 926.
The district court further erred in concluding that Mr. Hunter’s failure to initially serve the Louisiana Attorney General constituted an “inexcusable failure” to comply with the procedural requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 926. Further, the district court noted that the failure to style the application as a “successive” petition was impermissibly violative of La. C.Cr.P. Art. 926 and warranted dismissal.
There is no dispute that Article 926 contemplates service upon both the district attorney and the attorney general. However, the purpose of that requirement is to ensure notice and an opportunity to respond to the allegations raised in the application. The record does not support a finding that the omission in this case was deliberate, strategic, undertaken in bad faith, or intended to deprive the State of notice. Rather, the failure to serve the Attorney General was an inadvertent procedural oversight that was promptly corrected once identified. Significantly, the Ouachita Parish District Attorney’s Office — the prosecuting authority that tried Mr. Hunter’s case and represented the State throughout the underlying proceedings — was served with and received notice of the application. Thus, this is not a case in which the State lacked notice of the claims being asserted. The prosecuting authority was aware of the filing, aware of the allegations being raised, and fully capable of responding to them. The omission involved only service upon the Attorney General and did not deprive the State’s prosecuting authority of notice or participation in the proceedings.
Notably, the Court’s ruling identifies no prejudice resulting from the omission. The ruling does not find that the District Attorney lacked notice, that the Attorney General was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to participate, that evidence was concealed, or that the State’s ability to respond to the application was impaired in any respect. The absence of any identified prejudice is significant because the purpose of the service requirement is to ensure notice and an opportunity to be heard. Where notice has been provided, the defect has been cured, and no prejudice has been demonstrated, dismissal of substantial constitutional claims based upon a procedural oversight serves no legitimate purpose and elevates form over substance.
Nor did the omission affect the substance of the claims presented to the Court. The constitutional issues raised in Mr. Hunter’s application remain unchanged regardless of whether service was initially perfected upon the Attorney General. Likewise, the omission did not alter the factual record, conceal evidence, impede the Court’s ability to evaluate the merits of the application, or otherwise prejudice the State’s ability to defend the conviction.
The extraordinary nature of the claims asserted further weighs against dismissal on procedural grounds. Mr. Hunter alleges that the State failed to disclose material impeachment evidence concerning one of its principal witnesses in violation of Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States, and Napue v. Illinois. These allegations strike at the heart of the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system and implicate fundamental due process protections guaranteed by both the Louisiana and United States Constitutions.
With respect to the court’s determination regarding the procedural deficits in Mr. Hunter’s petition constituting “inexcusable failure to comply” under La. C.Cr.P. Art. 926, when a denial is on procedural grounds and not on the merits, federal habeas consideration does not need to defer to the decision of the State courts. In Mercadel v. Cain, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s one-word denial of post-conviction relief claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was on procedural grounds, not on the merits, and thus, federal habeas court was not required to defer to decision, although rejection was silent as to reason for denial of relief, where petitioner addressed application to Supreme Court, which lacked original jurisdiction to hear merits of state prisoners’ habeas petitions, and Louisiana Supreme Court had consistently refused to consider merits of state court prisoners’ habeas petitions originally filed in its court. Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1999).
Likewise, the erroneous omission in styling the petition as a “Uniform Application” as opposed to a “Second o[r] Successive Uniform Application” was similarly non-prejudicial to the State. Mr. Hunter acknowledges that the 2026 filing constitutes a successive application. However, the failure to label the application as successive did not conceal that fact from the Court. Mr. Hunter respectfully requests that this Honorable Court reconsider its prior ruling given that the noted procedural defects have been corrected.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, based on the above and foregoing, Mr. Hunter prays that his Motion to Reconsider be deemed sufficient and this Honorable Court will grant an evidentiary hearing on his March 2026 Uniform Application In Support of Post-Conviction Relief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED — Jacob Longman (La. Bar # 38042), Kathryn Jakuback Burke (La. Bar # 37617), Jennifer Cameron (La. Bar # 39826), Counsel for Tony Hunter, Longman Jakuback APLC.
Disposition: denied June 9, 2026. The denial is among the rulings under review in the supervisory writ application pending in the Second Circuit. Bracketed characters mark corrections of minor artifacts in the filed text. Back to all case documents.