By Mrs. Eileen Hunter — about the author. Posted August 11, 2026.
Provenance: Uniform Application for Post-Conviction Relief, filed March 26, 2026 in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita, No. 02-F2021, Judge C. Wendell Manning presiding, by Jacob Longman and Kathryn Jakuback Burke, Longman Jakuback, APLC. Supplemented April 20, 2026; denied April 29, 2026; reconsideration denied June 9, 2026; now under review in the pending writ. Transcribed below in full from the filed application; wording as filed, obvious scanning artifacts silently corrected, uncertain readings bracketed. Record citations (R., ROA., Tr.) are the application’s own; its footnoted exhibits are the confidential Comanche records described in the Motion to Supplement and the Nelson materials transcribed here and here.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 17, 2002, Tony Hunter was charged with three counts of second-degree murder and one count of armed robbery.
During a bond hearing, Detective Harris testified that 221 Greenwood was “a major supplier of marijuana in that area.” R. 1435. Digital scales consistent with drug trafficking were recovered from the residence. R. 2046. Detective Harris testified that Rodgers “never had any links to Tony Hunter. Never said he [knew] him, you [know] as far as knowing him, business with him there, did not.” R. 1435. There was no physical evidence linking Tony Hunter to the crime scene — no fingerprints, no tire tracks, foot prints, no DNA, nothing. R. 1435, 2045. Clothing was collected from Tony Hunter’s apartment and processed for any blood evidence. R. 2101. The red truck’s upholstery and carpet were vacuumed and the results tested for blood evidence or hair, all with negative results. R. 2102, 2104.
Trial began on February 17, 2004. On February 25, 2004, following defense counsel’s opening statement, the prosecution filed a Motion in Limine seeking to prevent the defense from questioning Detective Harris about information he learned during his investigation and from eliciting information related to marijuana being sold and delivered at 221 Greenwood.
On March 4, 2004, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged on the three counts of second-degree murder and one count of armed robbery. Hunter’s Motion for New Trial and Motion for Post-Judgment Verdict of Acquittal were denied. On May 25, 2004, Judge Wendell Manning sentenced Tony Hunter to three life sentences, without parole, and forty nine and a half years for the robbery, all four counts to run consecutively to each other. Mr. Hunter’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Tony Lavelle Hunter, 907 So.2d 200 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/05); writ denied, 925 So.2d 507 (La. 3/10/06).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These murders happened late in the evening of March 10, 2001, at a home on Greenwood Drive in the Tanglewood Heights subdivision of Monroe, Louisiana. The adult victim, 24-year-old Levi Williams (“Chico”), lived at the home with two other adults, Anthony Rodgers (“Anthony”) and Harold Black (“Harold”), and a 16-year-old boy, Henry Staten (“Henry”), who was Anthony’s godson. Harold Black’s .45 caliber handgun was recovered from the road. R. 2048. On March 17, 2001, Corporal Tommy Crowson recovered a .22 caliber handgun in the 1600 block of 165. R. 2063–4.
On the evening of March 10, 2001, Anthony held the opening night for his new nightclub, “Club Daddy’s,” on Ticheli Road in Monroe, Louisiana. Anthony’s first cousin, Douglas Simons (“Douglas”), came to Monroe to help him with opening night at the club and was staying with him at 221 Greenwood Drive.
On March 7, 2001, Sgt. Hawkins of the OPSO conducted a traffic stop of Tony Hunter in the Tanglewood subdivision. He was driving a red pick up truck. R. 2081.
Early that evening Chico, Douglas, Harold and Henry left 221 Greenwood Drive and went to Club Daddy’s to assist Anthony with its operation. During the evening, after the club became crowded with patrons, Anthony sent Douglas to get change for $40. ROA. 1822. Douglas left in Anthony’s car and went to two gas stations looking for change, but was unsuccessful. In the meantime, because Douglas had not returned, Anthony sent Chico to 221 Greenwood Drive to retrieve change. Chico left the club driving his white Ford Explorer.
Before Chico arrived at the home, Anthony’s sister, Emma Rodgers (“Emma”), drove by 221 Greenwood Drive on the way to her mother’s house, located on the same street. She had been at work and was on the way to pick up her children, after which she intended to return home. She did not see any vehicles at 221 Greenwood Drive, so she did not stop. She did, however, notice a red Ford F-150 pickup truck with one non-functioning headlight and dark-tinted windows headed toward the home. She did not recognize this truck and had not seen it in the neighborhood before.
Chico drove to 221 Greenwood Drive and parked in the yard in front of the door as was his custom. Chavez Staten (“Chavez”) and Jeremy Staten (“Jeremy”), both eleven years old, were staying alone in the home at this time. After Chico arrived at the home to get change, Emma, on her way back from her mother’s house, drove back past 221 Greenwood Drive on her way out of the neighborhood. As she drove by, she noticed Chico’s white Explorer parked in the yard; but, because her children were asleep in the car, Emma decided not to stop and visit. She did, however, note that no lights were on in the house at the time.
When Chico did not return and did not answer his cell phone, Henry and Douglas drove to 221 Greenwood Drive to check on him. Henry opened the front door with his key and saw Chavez and Jeremy lying on the floor, both shot in the head. Henry ran from the house to the car to get Douglas, who then went into the home and saw the children. The pair then left the home and used their cell phone to call Anthony and the police.
Upon receipt of the news, Anthony and several others went to the scene. Harold entered the house, armed himself with his .45-caliber pistol and searched for a possible assailant. During their search of the house, the group found Chico lying on the floor of the bedroom, also shot in the head. Chavez, Jeremy and Chico were transported to a nearby hospital, but all three died from their gunshot wounds.
Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office (“OPSO”) Deputies David Godwin and John Spires responded to the scene. Deputy Spires secured Harold’s pistol and detained him temporarily during the investigation.
There were casings from at least 2 weapons recovered from the crime scene. Harold’s gun and ammunition [were] excluded. OPSO investigators recovered five live .22-caliber cartridges, four spent .22-caliber cartridge cases, three spent .45-caliber cartridge cases and a live .45-caliber cartridge on the floor of the house. Deputies also found a box of live .45-caliber cartridges in a desk in Levi Williams’ bedroom. ROA. 1807. The spent .45-caliber shell casings found on the floor were the same brand and caliber as those in the box of live cartridges found in Williams’ desk. R. 2047.
The OPSO also found a small safe, three rifles, a set of keys, a set of digital scales and a bag full of what appeared to be marijuana.
No usable finger or tire prints were discovered. The deadbolt on the open front door was in the locked position; however, the door facing was damaged as if it had been forced open. The OPSO canvassed the neighborhood seeking leads for its investigation, but none of the residents provided any assistance. Douglas Simonds told the police that the word on the streets was that someone nicknamed “Fats” or “Fat” had committed the crime. ROA. 1834.
The only evidence to corroborate the snitch witnesses was Emma Rodgers’ testimony that earlier in the evening she had seen a red truck with a malfunctioning headlight near 221 Greenwood Drive.
Vaccara Comanche
At time of testimony, [Comanche was] serving a ten year sentence for possession of firearm. ROA. 1941. Sentenced on February 21, 2002, to five years on a revocation of probation for Aggravated Battery, consecutive to 10 years on felon in possession of firearm. Comanche testified that he was in someone else’s cell when he “overheard” a conversation between Glen Dale Nelson, who was on the top bunk, and Tony Hunter, who was outside on the Rec Yard. ROA. 1943. According to Comanche, Tony Hunter sent someone to get Glen Dale Nelson. Glen Dale Nelson finished his card game and went into the cell. Comanche testified that he followed Glen Dale Nelson into the cell because they had been talking. His testimony was that he climbed onto the top bunk with Nelson and was sitting right next to Glen Dale Nelson while the conversation with Tony Hunter was taking place. ROA. 1950, 1970. When asked if Hunter knew he was sitting next to Nelson during the conversation, Comanche responded, “Quite naturally. I’m sitting right beside him.” R. 1971.
Comanche testified that four or five other people were in the cell where he and Glen Dale Nelson were during the conversation. ROA. 1947. Comanche testified that the others were not listening to the conversation; “they were either laying down listening to their radios or asleep.” R. 1947.
Hunter asked him who he was “running his mouth to.” ROA. 1944. Glen Dale Nelson allegedly told Hunter that “he ain’t got nothing to worry about the weapon. It can’t lead back to him.” [R.] 1944. Comanche testified that he heard Hunter refer to the weapon as a “.22”. ROA. 1945. According to Comanche, Tony Hunter said that “Chico was the only one supposed to be there” and he had to chase the kids around the house. ROA. 1945. Comanche testified that Tony told Glen Dale Nelson that he had to kill the kids because they “had seen his face because he had been around a couple of times and they recognized who he was.” Comanche testified that the conversation between Glen Dale Nelson and Tony Hunter lasted ten minutes. R. 1952. Comanche stated that he and the prosecutor had spoken about two weeks prior and that he had not been promised anything in exchange for his testimony. ROA. 1946.
On cross-examination, Comanche admitted that when he had been interviewed by Detective Harris when he had first been arrested, he had asked Harris what Harris could “do for him.” R. 1954. According to Comanche, Harris told him that he “couldn’t make me no promises like that. He told me that he couldn’t do nothing. Only thing he could do is talk to somebody but he can’t do nothing for me.” R. 1956.
Following Comanche’s testimony, the Court reviewed an eight (8) page July 20, 2001 statement he gave to Det. Harris and ordered it released to the defense due to several inconsistencies between it and his testimony at trial. R. 1961. In that statement, Comanche told Detective Harris that Hunter did not know he was present during the conversation because:
“It was a blanket like, ah, in front of the bed and so it was blocking me out because see, I was down there listening to the radio at first. Then when I heard them telling tell Glen Dale to come here, I pulled the plugs to my ear and turned the radio off so nobody would know that I was down there. Then they just started discussing it. He didn’t know that nobody was up in the room but the person that told him that Trigger was at the window, and that was it.” R. 1972.
When confronted with the inconsistencies in his statements, Comanche backtracked and testified that it wasn’t actually one conversation, but multiple conversations between Glen Dale Nelson and Tony Hunter that he overheard discussing the Tanglewood murders: “sometimes he knew I was right there beside him and sometimes he didn’t know I was there.” R. 1972.
The defense questioned Detective Medaries about how many recorded statements they actually took from Vaccara Comanche during the course of their investigation. Detective Medaries testified that Comanche was actually providing information on several different matters: “We took two recorded statements from [Comanche] on July the 20th. One of the statements we took from him, ah, was relative to information he had regarding the killings on Greenwood. We took another recorded statement from him about information he was going to provide us in an unrelated case that we were working.” R. 1989.
Hunter was arrested on May 4, 2001. Comanche was later interviewed by law enforcement on July 20, 2001 associated with Mr. Hunter’s “statements” regarding the Tanglewood murders. During the pendency of Mr. Hunter’s case, Comanche was under threat of a habitual offender bill — filed November 25, 2002 [sic]. Contrary to Mr. Comanche’s testimony that there were no deals or inducements made to compel his testimony, Counsel has discovered that following his favorable testimony Comanche’s sentence was not enhanced with the habitual offender filing. Counsel discovered this inducement/plea evidence on March 27, 2025.
Christopher Wiggins
Christopher Wiggins was called as a witness and immediately refused to testify. R. 2086. The prosecutor told him that he did not have a Fifth Amendment Right not to testify. R. 2087. The prosecutor requested that Wiggins be held in Ouachita. The following day, Wiggins took the stand for the prosecution. Wiggins testified that he was serving a ten-year sentence following a 2000 plea for forgery. R. 2129. Wiggins testified that he was in an isolation cell with Tony Hunter for 2 months. R. 2129. Wiggins testified that Tony told him he kicked the door in and committed a robbery in the Tanglewood area which “lead to three people being killed.” Wiggins testified that Tony said “he went to rob them and the guy didn’t want to, ah, show him where the drugs and money was so he shot him.” R. 2130. Regarding the kids, Wiggins stated that “they seen his face upon him leaving out the house and he couldn’t leave no witness behind so he had to kill them.” R. 2130. Wiggins testified that Hunter told him he used a .38 and a 9 millimeter to kill the victims. R. 2139.
Wiggins admitted that after he was taken out of court, he asked the District Attorney’s Office to give him leniency on his sentence. R. 2131. Wiggins had previous convictions for attempted robbery and manslaughter, for which he served fifteen years. R. 2135. He had prior convictions for simple robbery and simple burglary. At the time of his testimony against Tony Hunter, he had five felony convictions and faced a life sentence if he was multi-billed. R. 2135. He had been placed in isolation at Ouachita Correctional Center for gambling. R. 2134.
Clarence Kennedy
On June 6, 2001, court records reflect that two active cases were assigned to the same judge. Shortly thereafter, on June 8, 2001, an indictment for simple burglary was filed. By June 12, 2001, television and newspaper coverage identified Hunter as a suspect in the matter.
On July 20, 2001 [sic], Clarence Kennedy provided a statement to law enforcement regarding the triple homicide. In his statement, Kennedy claimed that he overheard a conversation between Nelson and Hunter, which he alleged occurred on either July 6 or July 7, 2001 [sic].
According to page 605 of the trial transcript, Kennedy admitted that he spoke with an investigator about Tony’s case on February 10 or 11, 2002, but denied receiving any deal or assistance. Notably, on February 11, 2002 [sic], the State received a Gene Screen report excluding Hunter from any connection to the murder scene, the victims, and the alleged murder weapon.
Just two days later, on February 13, 2002, the State filed a motion to dismiss Kennedy’s pending simple burglary charge as part of a plea arrangement. This critical information was never disclosed to Tony or his counsel. Thus, despite Kennedy’s claims that he received no benefit, the timing of the dismissal strongly suggests otherwise.
Further compounding this issue, page 592 of the trial transcript reflects that Kennedy’s simple burglary charge was presented to the jury as a conviction. In fact, the charge had been dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement prior to trial. Both Kennedy and the State failed to disclose this leniency, effectively concealing evidence of a potential inducement in exchange for Kennedy’s testimony against Hunter.
Glen Dale Nelson
On January 26, 2001 [sic], Glen Dale Nelson signed an affidavit stating that he was incarcerated at the Ouachita Parish Correctional Center and that on February 12, 2001 he gave false information to Sgt. David Harris regarding Tony Hunter’s involvement in the Roderick Hall homicide “so [he] could go home.”
On January 31, 2012, Glen Dale Nelson signed an affidavit swearing that: “It was a jailhouse c[o]nning scheme organized by my friends Vaccarra Comanche and Clarence Kennedy to get a conviction for the state against our enemy, Tony Hunter.” (Full transcription.)
In State v. Hill, Dewayne Hill argued that the trial court erred when it denied his Motion to Exclude the testimony of Glen Dale Nelson, a repeat jail informant, who ultimately testified against him at trial. State v. Hill, 601 So.2d 684, 688–89 (La. Ct. App. 1992), writ denied, 608 So.2d 192 (La. 1992). Hill argued that after his arrest, he was incarcerated at the Ouachita Parish Jail for eighteen months before trial. While there, Glen Dale Nelson was housed with defendant for several weeks. Hill claimed that Nelson was a government agent, placed in defendant’s cell for the purpose of eliciting incriminating information from him for use at his trial. Nelson in fact testified at trial. He stated that defendant admitted his involvement in the murder to him. In Hill, Nelson denied that anyone asked him to interrogate or otherwise obtain information from the defendant… Hill attempted to show Nelson’s status as a government agent through the testimony of Theodore R. Washington. Washington testified that Nelson’s general reputation was that of a “snitch,” but he could not testify from personal knowledge that Nelson was an agent of the government… The Louisiana Supreme Court held that, on the record before them, Hill failed to show “either that Nelson was an agent of the government or that the state created a situation likely to induce the defendant to make incriminating statements.”
Current counsel for Mr. Hunter interviewed Mr. Nelson on February 27, 2026 — a transcript of that conversation is attached in which Mr. Nelson claimed to current counsel that he recalls speaking to Mr. Hunter but denies the allegations that there was a conversation in which Tony Hunter claimed that he committed the murder. Mr. Nelson indicated, in accordance with the affidavit compiled in January 2012, that there was no conversation involving Mr. Hunter committing a homicide. (Full transcription.)
TIMELINESS OF PETITION
Tony Hunter files the instant Application timely. The Petition is based on a Brady violation — stemming from the discovery by current counsel of a favorable plea given to Vacarra Comanche following his testimony in Mr. Hunter’s case. Mr. Comanche was subject, at the time of his interview with law enforcement and testimony, to a Habitual Offender Bill that the State never used as an enhancement on existing and former sentences — presumably in exchange for his favorable testimony at Mr. Hunter’s trial which resulted in a conviction. At trial, Comanche claimed that no plea deal or inducement was offered. On March 27, 2025, counsel found evidence of the incorporated plea deal/inducement which was given to Comanche following his testimony favorable to the State.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
I. The suppressed evidence of a plea deal given to Vacarra Comanche in exchange for his testimony rises to the level of materiality under Brady and requires remedy.
The Supreme Court, in its landmark decision in Brady v. Maryland, broadly held that the prosecution must turn over evidence favorable to an accused upon request, where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the prosecution’s good or bad faith. Subsequent progeny went on to define and crystalize the three part framework of a Brady violation: i) whether the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused either because it is exculpatory or impeaching, ii) whether the evidence was suppressed by the state either advertently or inadvertently, regardless of request, and iii) whether the evidence is material — meaning had the evidence been presented at trial, it could have affected the judgment of the jury, and is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the standing verdict. The determination that a particular piece of evidence is favorable to the defendant merely designates that piece of evidence as being Brady material. It is the suppression of that evidence and its materiality to the case that constitutes a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial and necessitates a remedy.
The favorability of a piece of evidence creates the obligation that the prosecution disclose the evidence to the defendant… The Brady Court defined favorable as being “material either to guilt or to punishment.” In U.S. v. Bagley, the Supreme Court expanded Brady material to include impeachment evidence, noting that the constitutional error was in the failure “to assist the defense by disclosing information that might be helpful in conducting the cross-examination” and the suppression of such material amounts [to] denial of the ‘right of effective cross-examination’, a “constitutional error of the first magnitude” requiring automatic reversal. The Bagley Court found that impeachment evidence constituted “evidence favorable to an accused”: if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal. When there are questions of favorability as to a piece of evidence, prosecutors should err on the side of disclosure, rather than suppression.
All evidence related to any inducement given to Comanche is certainly material, as the interview with Glen Nelson and current counsel confirms that Comanche’s testimony was false — therefore, the jury should have been given the opportunity to question the credibility of Comanche in order to render a fair verdict. Instead, defense counsel proceeded to trial unarmed with evidence that Comanche was “paid” by the State and, therefore, the jury was not appropriately equipped to make a factual determination that the “jailhouse informant’s” statement was false. Given the relative lack of physical evidence against Mr. Hunter, the informant’s testimony was overwhelmingly used by the jury to render a determination of guilt.
Evidence having been deemed favorable becomes Brady material, obligating the State to turn it over to the defense. The State’s suppression — failure to disclose — of that material results in a Brady violation. The Third Circuit in U.S. ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, on which Brady relied, stated that the ‘suppression of evidence favorable’ to the accused was itself sufficient to amount to a denial of due process. The Court in Brady promoted the principle that the remedy for this violation “is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” The Court noted that to allow a prosecution that withholds evidence of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. It allows a prosecutor to take on the “role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice.”
Kyles v. Whitley further crystallized the precepts of Brady in holding the prosecution liable for evidence in possession of detectives but unknown to the district attorney. In Kyles, the Court determined that “the essence of the State’s case was the testimony of eyewitnesses” who identified Kyles as Dye’s killer. Reversing Kyles’ conviction, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police. But whether the prosecution succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation… the prosecution’s responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is inescapable.
Once a violation has been recognized, the Supreme Court holds that only if the disclosure of that evidence was material to the case does the failure to disclose require a remedy, through reversal of the conviction… A prosecutor’s breach of the constitutional duty to disclose does not rise to a level that requires the reversal of a conviction, unless the omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Materiality asks whether the now convicted defendant — having had the favorable evidence which was suppressed by the State — would have obtained a different outcome. “Materiality” is determined by asking whether the disclosure of the evidence would have created a “reasonable probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been different… When looking at whether evidence not disclosed by the State was “material”, the cumulative effect of the evidence is considered rather than each item of evidence individually.
II. Evidence of a plea/inducement given to Vacarra Comanche was evidence favorable to the defense.
Louisiana courts have largely followed the federal definition of favorability as “evidence that is material either to guilt or punishment”, finding that the rule encompasses both exculpatory and impeachment evidence. State v. Brown, 2016-0998 (La. 1/28/22); 347 So.3d 745, 834… Exculpatory evidence is defined as evidence that directly supports the defendant’s innocence or reduces their culpability for the charged offense. State v. Verret, 960 So.2d 208 (2007). Likewise, impeachment evidence is evidence that undermines the credibility or reliability of a prosecution witness, particularly when the witness’s testimony is critical to determining guilt or innocence. State v. Newton, 129 So.3d 25 (2013).
Louisiana courts have also acknowledged the Brady rule extends to both late disclosure and/or non-disclosure of favorable evidence that significantly impacts the defendant’s opportunity to effectively present the evidence or compromises the trial’s fundamental fairness. State v. Kemp, 828 So.2d 540, 545 (La. 2002). The Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(d), likewise places on prosecutors the responsibility to: “make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows, or reasonably should know, either tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense…” Justice Weimer’s concurrence in In re Seastrunk, which held that the rule of professional conduct governing a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations is coextensive with the Brady standard for disclosure, aptly noted “a prosecutor’s responsibility to identify information that must be disclosed to the defense is a weighty responsibility. Fundamental fairness and due process within the criminal justice system depend on prosecutors meeting this responsibility.” In re Seastrunk, 236 So.3d 509, 522 (La. 2017).
The ability to present a defense is an i[nh]erent Constitutional right and the basis for a fair trial. Mr. Hunter’s defense was unable to do so because the State suppressed evidence that would have given him and his defense team the information they needed to impeach the credibility of Comanche. The inability to launch that defense because the State withheld material evidence is a direct violation of Mr. Hunter’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
III. The favorable evidence was not turned over to the defense in any discovery responses or at any other time before trial and was therefore suppressed.
Louisiana adheres to the Brady standard announced by the Supreme Court in 1963… Brady imposes an affirmative duty on the prosecution “to learn of” and to disclose to the defense all favorable, material information known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case. It is not the role of the defense to seek out exculpatory evidence within the possession of the prosecution. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 695 (2004). The prosecution has an affirmative obligation to disclose this type of evidence to the defense. However, when there is a failure in this obligation, it is immaterial whether that failure was in good or bad faith…
Suppression is not difficult to understand. Where favorable evidence was not disclosed, it has been suppressed. The term “suppression” encompasses both the intentional withholding of evidence and inadvertent nondisclosure. Such is the case here. Comanche, as referenced above, testified before the jury that there were no favorable inducements or plea deals that influenced his testimony — additionally, Mr. Hunter was not made aware by the State pretrial that Comanche was under the subject of a Habitual Offender Bill at the time of trial or that the State intended not to use that filing to enhance his existing sentences.
IV. The suppression of the details of the plea inducement prejudiced Mr. Hunter’s defense at trial.
Consistent with the “overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt”, a constitutional error has occurred, and the conviction must be overturned, only if the evidence is material in the sense that the suppression of that information “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). In line with federal precedent, Louisiana jurisprudence likewise holds, “Evidence is ‘material’, and would require disclosure under Brady, when there is any reasonable likelihood it could have affected the judgment of the jury, and it is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the verdict.” State v. Johnson, 229 So. 3d 610, 615 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/12/16).
For purposes of Brady’s due process rule, a reviewing court determining materiality must ascertain not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. State v. Bright, 875 So.2d 37, 42 (La. 5/25/04). Thus, the reviewing court does not put the withheld evidence to an outcome-determinative test… Instead, a Brady violation occurs when the “evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”
It is further settled under Brady that “if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113 (1976). In State v. Bright, 875 So. 2d 37, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that “when the State’s case hinges on the testimony of one eyewitness, the Brady violation looms larger.” Given that the testimony presented by the State at trial was the testimony of “jailhouse snitch” witnesses, testimony that Comanche had received a favorable inducement would have, necessarily, undermined the State’s case and the fact that it was not presented undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.
REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT
Mr. Hunter requests that he be granted an evidentiary hearing under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 930. The claims for relief alleged above raise questions of fact which cannot be resolved on the face of the pleadings or by affidavits, depositions, or the like. Therefore, Mr. Hunter requests an evidentiary hearing on all claims for which the facts are in dispute. Cf. State v. Tyson, 18-1475 (La. 4/22/19), 267 So. 3d 584. In addition, Mr. Hunter requests that he be granted an opportunity to supplement the existing claims within a reasonable time with any additional factual support that counsel may uncover while the matter is pending before this Honorable Court.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons and any that may appear to the Court, Mr. Hunter respectfully requests vacatur of his plea [sic], an evidentiary hearing, and an opportunity to supplement the existing petition.
Respectfully submitted — Jacob Longman (La. Bar Roll #38042), Kathryn Jakuback Burke (La. Bar Roll #37617), Counsel for Tony Lavelle Hunter, Longman Jakuback, APLC.
Editorial note: dates marked [sic] are transcribed as they appear in the filed application; several differ from other filed records (compare the case timeline). Per our corrections policy, we transcribe documents as filed and note discrepancies rather than silently harmonizing them. Disposition: denied April 29, 2026; reconsideration denied June 9, 2026; supervisory writ pending. Back to all case documents.